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  The dramatic rise in crop prices that occurred in the fall of 2006 was the 
beginning of an unprecedented level of volatility in agricultural markets.  For example, 
corn prices for most of this decade fluctuated within a range of US$0.50 per bushel 
around an average price in the low US$2 range.  However, corn prices on the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) doubled within a six week period beginning in September 2006 
and then doubled again by the spring of 2008 (Figure 1).  Corn prices have since fallen 
back but appear to be fluctuating around a new average price of around US$4 per 
bushel.  There also appears to be much greater price swings than in the past.  Similar 
price spikes occurred in the wheat market (Figure 2) but within a shorter time frame.  
The recent rise of wheat prices in July 2010 has revived memories of the commodity 
boom of 2006-2008. 
The dramatic price changes evident in the commodity markets have 
consequences for both consumers and producers.  The sudden increase in major crop 
prices translated into higher food prices in developing countries and spawned concerns 
over the “silent tsunami” that was spreading over the less fortunate who could not afford 
adequate nutrition.  While the apparent higher average prices are a benefit to 
producers, the corresponding volatility has imposed greater demands on price risk 
management for farmers and grain handlers.  The two most important purposes of 
derivative markets are risk shifting and price discovery. However, the “unusual” 
commodity market volatility has created uncertainty around the accuracy of prices and 
in the potential loss of the major price shifting tool producers and the industry have – 
just when they need it most.  Higher volatility increases hedging costs associated with 
financing margin calls, and the increases have been large enough to force the closure 
of some small and midsized elevators. Other grain elevators are coping with the 
volatility and hedging costs by refusing to buy crops in advance from farmers, barring 
the most common way farmers lock in prices.  In an attempt to determine appropriate 
policies to deal with the consequences of the dramatic price swings to both consumers 
and producers, answers are being sought to the questions surrounding the causes for 
price movements in the agricultural commodity markets. 
A number of factors contributed to the rise in prices and the degree of volatility 
experienced in 2007-2008 (Westhoff, 2010; Baffes and Haniotis, 2010; Piesse and 
Thirtle, 2009; Weersink et al., 2008).  The stock-to-use ratio had fallen to historic lows 
for most crops as production levels had flattened over the years in response to 
continued low prices.  Poor harvests then occurred in some major exporting countries in 
2006-2007 and this reduction in supply happened alongside several demand-side shifts.  
The US dollar fell relative to other currencies increasing the purchasing power of foreign 
commodity buyers.  These buyers were increasingly from countries such as China and 
India which were experiencing GDP growth that was several times the global average.  
In addition, renewable fuel mandates, particularly in the US, represented a new demand 
source that now accounts for over one-third of the US corn crop.   
Speculators were and continue to be a popular target for explaining the price 
swings experienced in the commodity markets.  The volume of activity in the CBOT for 2 
 
the major crops is shown by the line at the bottom of Figures 1 and 2.  The increase in 
the number of contracts traded mirrors the increase in price and is given by some as 
evidence that the activity has pushed prices above that implied by the underlying supply 
and demand fundamentals and increased the price volatility. It became common for 
political leaders and the media to argue that commodity index traders (CITs) and other 
large institutional investors exerted a destabilizing influence on prices, particularly after 
a submission by William Masters to a US Senate sub-committee in the summer of 2008 
(Masters 2008).  Subsequently, there have been demands for regulatory intervention to 
lessen the impacts of speculative trading on the assumption that the actions of index 
traders destabilize commodity prices.   
 

















The debate over the role of speculators on commodity prices has been renewed 
in the summer of 2010.  An OECD report by Irwin and Sanders (2010) released early in 
the summer dismissed the impact of index fund investments on commodity markets.  
While at the same time, other observers such as von Braun (2010) claim the doubling of 
wheat prices in July 2010 is partially due to the role of speculators and called for polices 
to dampen the volatility in agricultural markets.  
The purpose of this study is to review the impacts of commodity index traders on 
prices in agricultural commodity futures markets.  Specifically, we aim to answer the 
following questions:  
 
1.  How do commodity index traders operate? 
 
2. What are the arguments of those claiming speculators have influenced 
commodity and in some cases food prices (Weersink et al., 2009)?  
 
3.  What are the counter-arguments made by those who claim prices have moved 
due to underlying market fundamentals and not from speculator activity? 4 
 
 
4. What is the empirical evidence on the relationship between investment fund 
activity and commodity prices in the futures market? and,  
 
5.  What are the implications of the presence of commodity index traders for the risk 
management and price discovery role of the futures market? 
 
The next section reviews the mechanics of commodity index traders and how 
new financial products have resulted in the “financialization” of commodity futures 
markets. In section 3, we present the basis for the arguments made by Masters (2008) 
and others that the funds flowing from index fund trading created the price bubble 
observed in commodity markets.  The second part of section 3 presents the counter 
arguments of Irwin and Saunders (2010), among others, that the movement in 
commodity prices was not a bubble but rather the result of demand shifts and supply 
shocks that pushed prices higher.  Section 4 gives the empirical evidence on the role of 
speculative activity on commodity prices.  The results are generally mixed although 
there is more support for the view that the price changes were not a speculative bubble.  
The paper concludes with the implications of the findings for risk management and 
stabilization policy. 
 
2.0  Speculators, Derivative Markets and Access Liquidity 
  The purpose of this section is to describe the concepts related to the 
“financialization” of agricultural commodity markets.  It begins with examining the role of 
speculators in establishing commodity prices and the categorization of speculators by 
motivation and by place of transaction.  We then discuss the reasons for “new” money 
to flow into commodity markets.  The increasing attractiveness of these markets to 
investors was further stimulated by the development of new financial products.  The 
major financial instrument that allowed institutions and individuals to invest in 
commodity markets was a commodity index fund (CIT) and the details of this long-only 
product is described in the final sub-section.  A number of terms used in this section are 
unique to the futures market and are defined in the Appendix. 
2.1  The Role of Speculators 
 
  The futures market is a commodity exchange where futures contracts for buying 
and selling commodities for future delivery are traded.  The futures exchange offers 
standardized contracts on set amounts of many commodities.  In the vast majority of 
cases, traders of agricultural commodity futures contracts do not take physical delivery 
of the commodity being traded on the futures market.  The primary purpose of the 
futures market is to establish prices for commodities for delivery at specified times in the 
future, and to enable commercial market participants to protect their business activities 
against the risk of future price fluctuations.  In the futures market, the three major types 
of traders are: 
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(1) commercial  traders
1 or hedgers who use futures to reduce the risk of future 
unfavorable changes in the price of commodities that they handle;  
(2)  non-commercial traders or speculators who aim to benefit from future price 
movements; and,  
(3) arbitrageurs who attempt to profit by locking into more than one market (Hull, 
2008).  
Speculators have been characterized by many as both ‘bad’ and ‘good’ when 
market price are too low or too high.  Markets are efficient if all available information is 
embedded into the price, which subsequently then follows a random walk.  In well-
functioning capital markets, rational speculators enhance market efficiency (Grossman, 
1995; Stiglitz, 1980).  The market efficiency role of speculators has long been 
recognized (Smith, 1776; Mill, 1887; Keynes 1930; Freidman; 1953).  Adam Smith 
(1776) and John Stuart Mill (1887) indicated that speculators enhance the inter-
temporal allocation of resources and stabilize asset prices.  Later, Keynes (1930) 
argued that speculators provide liquidity to the market and underwrite the risks of price 
volatility in the spot market.  Meanwhile, Freidman (1959) suggested that profitable 
speculation - buying when price is low and selling when price is high - should stabilize 
commodity prices.  However, there are critics that question the role of speculators to 
enhance market efficiency and stabilize prices (Brunnermeier and Nagal, 2004).  
The literature identifies two types of speculators – rational traders (Friedman, 
1953) and noise traders (Black 1986).  Rational or informed speculators base trading on 
market fundamentals and are likely to stabilize markets by reducing excess price 
fluctuations.  Noise or uninformed traders are investors who irrationally trade noise as if 
it were information pertinent to the value of the assets (Black 1986; Kyle, 1985).  Noise 
traders can drive a wedge between market prices and fundamental values (Sanders 
and Irwin 2009a).  Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) arguing against the importance of 
noise traders, point out that informed/rational arbitrageurs trade against uninformed 
traders and in the process drive prices close to the fundamental values; thus noise 
traders lose money to arbitrageurs and eventually disappear from the market.
2 
According to this classification, speculative trading can be either stabilizing or 
destabilizing depending on which type of investors dominate the commodity market.  
While the efficient market hypothesis assumes that all trades are informed so that 
market fundamentals determine commodity prices, the information content of trades 
only become evident over time and uninformed trading based on trends in prices can 
significantly influence prices (Gilbert, 2010). 
Another means of categorizing speculators while also highlighting the functioning 
of a futures market, is to differentiate commodity transactions by the place in which they 
occur (physical versus financial) and the agents involved (hedgers versus speculators).  
                                                            
1 A “producer/merchant/processor/user” is a commercial entity that predominantly engages in the 
production, processing, packing or handling of a physical commodity and uses the futures markets to 
manage or hedge risks associated with those activities. 
2 De Long et al. (1989) provide a model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with 
erroneous stochastic beliefs affect prices and earn higher expected returns.  6 
 
The differentiation is summarized in Table 1 (Baffes and Haniotis 2010).  Commodity 
transactions can involve a physical exchange, such as corn being sold by a farmer to a 
local elevator, or a futures exchange, such as when the elevator hedges the corn 
purchase with a futures contract.  As noted above, hedgers are involved in commodity 
transactions at both places.  Speculators are also involved in both transaction locations.  
Most farmers, rather than hedge their commodity, tend to hold on to it in the hope of 
garnering a higher price than the one available at harvest.  Unless significant inventories are 
held that result in market manipulation (i.e. OPEC), this type of speculative activity tends to 
balance the market and reduce price variability (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010).  The bottom right 
quadrant of Table 1 encompasses speculators who do not transact physical commodities but 
instead arbitrage only on the futures market.  This group has grown significantly as will be 
discussed further in section 2.C.   
 
Table 1: Categorization of Commodity Transactions by Agents and Place 








Keeping resources in ground 
Market manipulation 
    
Financial  Producers/consumers 
Traders 
Banks 
Investment funds (i.e. pension 
funds) 
Investment & diversification 
instruments (i.e. hedge funds) 
Market manipulation 
Source: Baffes and Haniotis (2010). 
 
2.2  The Attraction of Commodity Markets to Investors 
 
  Traditional speculators, regardless of the categorization, have long been a 
fundamental part of futures markets, but the number of investors or speculators has 
increased over time.  Commodity markets became a more attractive investment 
compared to other options such as stocks or bonds in recent years due to higher 
expected returns, its negative correlation to other investments, and its protection against 
inflation.  As a result of these factors, “new” money flowed into the commodity markets. 
 
The annual returns and correlations for commodity index returns, stock returns, 
bond returns, and inflation are listed in Table 2.  The values in Table 2 support the idea 
that a commodity index is an attractive, separate asset class to be considered in a 
portfolio.  Returns on an index of commodities for a 30 year period starting in 1970, 
even before the recent price spike, were comparable to other asset classes.  In addition, 
commodities tended to have positive returns more frequently than equities and, as a 
consequence, provide another reason for investors wanting to include commodities in 
equity portfolios (IMF 2006).   7 
 
The higher relative returns for commodities evidenced in the last part of the 
previous century was enhanced by the low interest rates during most of the last decade.  
Rather than invest in bonds, the resulting excess liquidity flowed into other alternatives 
including commodity markets (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010). 
Commodity index returns also are negatively correlated with returns in other 
asset classes (Table 2).  Global crises, such as natural disasters and geopolitical 
conflict, tend to raise commodity prices while affecting equities negatively, thereby 
making commodities an attractive risk-reducing option in a portfolio.  Thus, commodity 
markets not only offered good returns relative to stocks and bonds, but also provided a 
significant diversification to typical asset classes.  The diversification characteristic 
placed commodities in a role similar to gold and set the stage for the “financialization of 
commodities” (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010). 
Commodity index investments also offer protection against inflation, and positive 
returns when commodity prices are rising (Greer, 2000).  As Robert Greer (2000: p. 45) 
put it “Unexpected inflation may result in negative returns to stock and equity market 
while often being favorable to increasing commodity prices.  In addition… commodity 
indexes may provide exposure to long-term growth in world demand that may also 
result in an increasing demand and prices for certain commodity products.” 
 
Table 2: Correlation for Commodity Index Returns, Stocks Returns, Bonds 
Returns and Inflation (1970-1999) 
 Commodity  Index  Stock  Bonds  Inflation 
Commodity Index  1.00  -0.14  -0.32  0.23 
Stocks   1.00  0.39  -0.43 
Bonds     1.00  -0.43 
        
Average Annual Return  12.2%  14.9%  9.6%   
Average Annual Volatility  19.6% 16.0%  12.1%   
Skewness 0.57  -0.67  0.76   
Source: Greer (2000) 
 
2.3  Commodity Index Speculators 
  The traditional approach to investing in a commodity market was through the 
purchase of a contract on a futures market like the Chicago Board of Trade.  The 
volatility and margin call risks meant that such an investment was made primarily by 
hedgers or traditional speculators and not ordinary, risk-averse investors.  The 
development of financial instruments, particularly commodity index funds, created a 
vehicle for individuals and institutions to readily invest in these markets that offer higher 
risk premiums and reduced portfolio risk.  A new category of trader, commodity index 
speculators (including pension and endowment funds), have been created and are now 
a significant part of futures markets. 
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Commodity index traders (CITs) are institutional investors engaged in 
commodities futures trading strategies that seek to replicate one of the major 
commodities indices by mechanically following that index’s methodology.  Commodity 
indexes (e.g., S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P-GSCI), CRB-Bridge, Chase 
Physical Commodity Index, J.P. Morgan Commodity Index, and the Dow Jones-AIG 
Commodity Index) are derivatives that swap dealers package for institutional investors 
to invest in a basket of commodities, where funds are not directly traded on futures 
exchange.  Figure 3 depicts the flow of transactions in the commodity index derivatives.  
 
CITs consider commodity futures as an asset class, comparable to equities, 
bonds, real estate and emerging market assets.  CITs take positions on commodities as 
a group based on the risk-return properties of portfolios containing commodity futures 
relative to those confined to traditional asset classes.  CITs are passive traders who 
take on price risk, and are buyers (with a transparent buy and hold strategy). The 
participation by active (informed) traders and noise traders provides information about 
the future returns of an asset class, whereas the participation by passive investors 
should have no predictive power (Kelly, 1997).  
 










As opposed to traditional speculators, index traders buy exposure to 
commodities in futures markets and maintain their position through pre-specified rolling 
strategies - buy and hold (Figure 4). Index funds provide a mechanism for the average 
investor to hold a position in the commodity market.  Commodity index traders seek 
exposure to commodities through passive long-term, long-only investment in commodity 
indexes.  Passively managed investments can be attractive to institutional investors with 
a longer-term investment horizon, such as pension funds.  As noted above, CITs earn a 
positive roll return if the commodity market is in backwardation.
3  “Backwardating” 
                                                            
3 Keynes (1935) provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of returns in a passive long-only 
commodity futures position: “…in normal conditions the spot price exceeds the forward price, i.e., there is 
“backwardation” (Keynes, 1935). Keynes’ (1930) and Hicks’ (1939) theory of normal backwardation 
postulated that the risk premium would on average accrue to the buyers of futures. The Keynes 
hypothesis holds that substantial producer hedging pressure causes the forward price of certain 
commodity futures contracts to fall to a discount to the spot commodity price. One implication of this 
hypothesis is that an investor who buys discounted commodity futures contracts may expect to earn a 











occurs if either the spot price is trading at a premium to its futures contracts or if a 
nearby-month futures contract is trading at a premium to distant futures contracts. In a 
backwardated market, contracts increase in price as they approach expiration, creating 
a positive roll yield. CITs profit by “rolling” into less-expensive, longer-term contracts. 
Suppose a current (nearby) month contract price for a commodity is $79.02 whereas the 
future (distance) month contract price is $78.40, a futures index that rolls from the 
current contract to the next month's contract will realize an annualized roll benefit of 
approximately 9.42 percent.  An index investor buys the second delivery nearby futures 
contract and holds it until it becomes the first nearby contract (Figure 4).  The index 
investor then sells the contract and buys the current second contract.  This is called 
rolling the futures position (Hull 2008).  This passive strategy is designed to gain 
exposure to commodity price movements as part of a portfolio development strategy.  
Roll return is one of the important components of the total returns from index trading 
(Erb and Harvey 2005; Feldman and Till 2006).  According to Gorton and Rouwenhorst 
(2004), roll returns are an important explanation for why the average return on 
commodity index futures has exceeded the average return from holding spot 
commodities.  The effectiveness of the long-only strategy to generate positive roll 
depends on the persistence of the factors that leads to backwardation, such as low 
levels of stock available for short selling and positive convenience yield (Domanski and 
Heath, 2007). Because futures price changes and roll yields are the sources of excess 
return for commodity indexes, long-only indexes have no way to capture the returns 
available from shorting futures when there is downward price pressure or a positively 
sloped futures price curve. Long-only indexes generate negative roll returns when 
markets are in contango and thus can have negative returns when commodity prices 
are rising. 
 
Figure 4: Buy and Hold Strategy:  In a backwardated market, contracts increase in 
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Table 3: Selected Agricultural Commodities Futures Markets Open Interest, 2008 
  Long (Demand Side, %)  Price 
Increases 
$ Value of Open Interest  







2003 -08  2002  2008 
Corn 41  24  35  134  5435  37,427 
Soy Oil  46  22  32  199  1,441  8,868 
Soybeans 30  28  42  143  4,883  37,399 
Wheat CBT  17  20  64  314  1,836  19,742 
Wheat KC  37  32  31  276  1,304  6,253 
Feeder 
Cattle 
17 53  30  34  540  1,818 
Lean Hogs  18  20  63  10  602  4,465 
Live Cattle  13  24  63  23  2,670  8,764 
 
The amount of money invested in commodity index funds has risen from $13 
billion at the end of 2003 to $260 billion in March 2008 (Masters 2008).  In terms of crop 
markets specifically, Masters (2008) noted that index speculators purchased over 2 
billion bushels of corn contracts on the CBOT in a 5 year period beginning in 2003 
(Table 3).  Total investment in commodity index funds dropped slightly in 2009 to 
approximately $240 billion due to lower commodity prices.  Although this amount is 
approximately 1% of the global value of pension and sovereign wealth funds, it is large 
relative to the size of commodity markets ((Baffes and Haniotis, 2010).  The next 
question is what impacts did this “new” money have on commodity markets? 
3.0  Potential Effect of Index Funds On Commodity Markets 
3.1  Index Funds Created a Price Bubble 
  The correlation between the value invested by commodity index funds (CITs) and 
the increase in commodity futures prices is indisputable (Figures 1 and 2).  One group 
of CIT critics argues that the large inflow of funds into commodity markets by index 
investors caused prices to rise higher than justified by economic fundamentals (Gheit, 
2008; Masters, 2008; Masters and White, 2008; Soros 2008).  These critics contend the 
new money became the driving force in the market and created a price bubble, as 
opposed to the traditional view in which commercial hedgers determine the volume of 
activity and speculators follow. 
 
The concern over CITs was ignited in part to the submission by Michael Masters 
to the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs in July 
2008.  Masters noted that while traditional speculators have always been an integral 
part of the commodity futures market, index speculators are a relatively new component 
that entered after the stock market fall of 2002.  As Masters (2008) testified and as 
discussed in the previous section, index speculators buy futures and roll their positions 
forward by buying calendar spreads in contrast to traditional speculators who buy and 
sell future positions.  The “virtual hoarding” by CITs represented a new demand shock 
that decreased market liquidity rather than enhanced it as with traditional speculators.  11 
 
As commodity prices rise, the subsequent allocation to a commodity futures index 
increases thereby accelerating the rate of price increase.  Thus, investors betting on 
high prices became a self-fulfilling prophesy according to Masters (2008).  Soros (2008) 
also argued that investment in instruments linked to commodity indices exaggerated the 
price rises and called these funds the “elephant in the room” with respect to the 
commodity price shocks. 
 
Petzel (2009) suggested that the funds flowing into commodity markets through 
CITs and others represented not only a new demand but one that was too large relative 
to the size of the market.  Petzel (2009) claims that the effect of taking a long position 
and continually rolling the hedge forward created a “synthetic” long position that was 
balanced against short positions held by commercial participants holding actual 
inventories of the commodity.  As a result, the “synthetic” buying pressure relative to the 
actual stocks of the commodity pushes up prices in the short-run. 
 
The conditions for inventory levels under which CITs can lead to a speculative 
price bubble are formalized by Hamilton (2009).  The three conditions as described by 
Irwin and Saunders (2010 are: (1) CIT positions for a commodity are positively related 
to its futures prices; (2) the own-price elasticity for the commodity is very low so 
increases in the futures price are passed on mostly to consumers; and (3) inventories of 
the commodity do not increase.  The existence of these conditions is tested by some of 
the studies discussed in Section 4. 
 
3.2  Index Funds Did Not Create a Price Bubble 
  The view that the new money flowing into commodity futures markets from CITs 
and other investors drove prices upward is countered by a group of economists 
including Scott Irwin and Paul Krugman who claim there is no causal link between 
commodity trading activity and futures prices.  The lack of a link is based on four 
counter arguments described in Irwin and Saunders (2010) and Irwin et al (2009): (1) 
physical inventories are not held by index investors; (2) new money or new demand for 
contracts are met by new supply; (3) index funds will sell rather than increase 
investment levels during rising prices acting to stabilize futures prices; and (4) the 
trading by CITs is predictable rather than noise trading that could possibly influence 
price away from fundamentals. 
 
The first counter argument against the view that index funds fueled the price 
boom is that virtual hoarding does not exist (Krugman 2008).  Futures markets trade 
contracts for buying and selling commodities for future delivery and rarely involve 
dealing with actual physical goods.  In order to impact cash prices, the CITs must take 
delivery of the good after letting their long position contract expire and then hold these 
physical inventories off the market.  While the Hunt Brothers did so a generation ago in 
the silver market, there is no evidence that CITs have taken possession of commodities 
and thus affected the cash price through hoarding. 
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A second argument given by Irwin et al (2009) is that the new demand for futures 
contracts by CITs can be met by a new supply of contracts.  Unlike the supply of the 
actual physical commodity, there is no limit on the number of futures contracts that can 
be created.  The futures market is a zero-sum game so for every long (or short 
position), a corresponding short (or long) position is established.  Consequently, if the 
long positions of the CITs represent a new demand, the short positions of the same 
contracts represent the new supply (Irwin et al 2009).  This new supply does not require 
the inducement of a higher price.  Since futures markets are zero-sum games, the 
money inflows will not directly impact prices. 
 
Irwin  et al (2009) also suggest that the passive investment strategy by CITs 
stabilizes the market rather than creating bubbles.  Masters and Soros along with others 
argue that index funds will invest more in commodity markets as prices rise and thus the 
investment is a self-fulfilling prophesy.  In contrast, Irwin (2008) claims that CITs invest 
a certain percentage of their portfolio in commodities.  Higher prices will raise index 
values, and thus cause the CITs to sell some of their positions to reduce the percentage 
back to the desired allocation.  The selling during times of high prices thereby acts to 
reduce prices and stabilize the market.  
 
A final argument revolves around the predictable nature of CIT trading.  As 
discussed earlier, trading must be unpredictable for any group to consistently push 
prices away from its market equilibrium.  Index funds follow the same passive 
investment strategy and do not attempt to hide their current positions or their next move.  
Consequently, Sandler and Irwin (2009a), argue that it is highly unlikely that other large 
traders would allow index funds to push future prices away from fundamental values for 
long when trades are easily anticipated. 
 
4.0 Empirical  Evidence 
  As with the theoretical debate, the empirical evidence on the impact of index 
funds on futures prices is inconclusive.   
 
4.1  Index Funds Drove Commodity Futures Prices 
  Initial evidence for those purporting CITs created a speculative price bubble in 
commodity markets were largely based on the correlation between the level of funds 
flowing into these markets and prices (Masters 2008).  Robles, Torero and von Braun 
(2009) note the relationship between agricultural futures prices and four proxies for 
speculation: (1) volume of futures contracts, (2) open interest in futures contracts, (3) 
ratio of volume to open interest, and (4) ratio of non-commercial positions to total 
positions in futures contracts.  In addition to noting the correlation, this study used 
Granger causality testing to determine if these speculative activity indicators drove 
prices or vice versa.  While the first two proxies do not appear to have affected 
commodity prices, the ratio of volume to open interest was found to forecast changes in 
wheat and rice prices.  Since it is assumed that speculators are more likely to get in and 
out of the market over a short period of time in contrast to commercial traders, an 
increase in the relative number of trades or volume reflects speculative activity.   13 
 
Similarly, an increase in the number of non-commercial positions, generally assumed to 
represent speculators, relative to commercial positions, assumed to represent hedgers 
of physical products, will proxy an increase in speculative activity.  Robles, Torero and 
von Braun (2009) found an increase in this ratio to have driven the price up for maize 
and soybeans.  It should be noted that these causality tests were conducted for the time 
period during which prices rose. 
 
Several subsequent studies have provided more substantive evidence.  In the oil 
market, Eckaus (2008) claims the 2008 oil price was a speculative bubble and Roubini 
(2009) feels that approximately half of the increase in oil price during the boom was due 
to “speculator and herding behavior”.  Plastina (2008) estimates cotton futures prices 
were 14% higher than they otherwise would have been during the price boom due to the 
activity of CITs.   
 
Gilbert has conducted two studies examining the impact of CITs on the price of 
four agricultural commodities (soybean, soybeans, corn and wheat) traded on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (Gilbert 2009, Gilbert 2010).  Gilbert (2009) found changes in 
CITs’ positions had a positive and persistent effect on soybeans futures returns, but the 
data failed to support the hypothesis that changes in CITs’ position influenced returns 
for corn, wheat and soybean oil.  This study concluded that there is weak evidence 
supporting the idea that that index investment contributed to the recent commodity price 
boom (Gilbert 2009).  
 
In a subsequent study, Gilbert (2010) assessed the impacts of potential demand 
and supply shocks across agricultural markets rather than examining these commodity 
markets separately.  A joint approach based on a capital asset pricing model is used 
since a demand shock that may appear small to an individual market can be much more 
important than a crop-specific supply shock if that shift in demand is common to a group 
of agricultural commodities.  Indeed, Gilbert (2010) finds demand-side shocks related to 
monetary and financial developments to be the main reasons for the movements in 
agricultural prices rather than idiosyncratic shocks such as biofuel demand and supply 
reductions for individual crops.  These developments included growing GDP in countries 
such as China, monetary expansion, and a depreciating US dollar, but index funds were 
the means by which these developments affected agricultural commodity prices.     
Gilbert feels the behaviour of CITs (i.e., long-only, position in an entire range of 
commodities, holding positions for a long time) differ from traditional speculators and 
suggests that the CITs relegated market fundamentals to a minor, supporting role and 
so one would expect greater price volatility  (due to reduced market liquidity) and 
greater price correlation across markets. While Gilbert (2010) concludes CITs were the 
major channel through which common demand-side shocks pushed up futures prices, 
he cautions against more stringent regulation of futures markets since it was the 







4.2  Index Funds Did Not Drive Futures Prices 
  While the correlation between volume of activity by index funds and the rise in 
commodity futures prices is given as evidence of the role of speculators, other 
descriptive data assessments suggests otherwise.  For example, inventories of 
agricultural commodities declined rather than increased as should occur if speculative 
activity is driving the price above the equilibrium based on market fundamentals 
(Krugman, 2008).  Others note that the presence of index funds did not have a 
consistent affect across commodity markets.  The 2006/08 price boom happened for 
commodities without futures markets such as rubber, onions, and iron ore (Headey and 
Fan, 2008) along with apples and edible beans (Irwin, Sanders and Merrin, 2009).   
Similarly, commodity markets without index participation, such as fluid milk, also rose 
(Irwin, Sanders and Merrin, 2009).  Even for markets with index participation, there was 
not a consistent effect as the relative concentration of index fund positions was much 
higher in the livestock market compared to the crop markets but the price increases 
were much smaller in the former. 
 
Sanders and Irwin (2009a) tested the impact of the relative size of index fund on 
returns across markets; and found minimal evidence that index fund positions impacted 
returns across markets.  In a related study, Sanders and Irwin (2009b), failed to find any 
link between commodity index activity and commodity futures prices using CIT position 
data from 2004-2009.  As well, Irwin and Holt (2004) investigated the impact of trading 
by large hedge funds and CTAs in 13 futures markets.  Consistent with the noise trader 
hypothesis, their findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between the 
trading volume of large hedge funds and CTAs and market volatility for nine of the 
markets (e.g., corn, soybeans, hogs, crude oil); and a positive but statistically 
insignificant relationship for the remaining four markets (e.g., soybeans).  Irwin and Holt 
concluded that large hedge funds and CTAs enhanced market efficiency by bringing 
valuable fundamental information to the market through their trading activities.   
 
Several studies have conducted an analysis similar to Robles, Torero and von 
Braun (2009) in which the direction of causality is tested between speculative activity 
proxies and commodity futures prices.  Haigh et al. (2005) and IMF (2006) both 
concluded that price changes have led to changes in commodity index investor interest 
(primarily managed money traders) rather than the other way round  Using CFTC data, 
Haigh et al. (2005) studied the relationship between futures prices and the positions of 
managed money traders.  Haigh et al. (2005) found index investors more often adjust 
their long positions after price moved and not before, which suggests that changes in 
CITs’ positions are a reaction to price changes as opposed to a cause of price changes.  
The same study also noted that CITs provide liquidity to large hedgers, which 
subsequently has an effect on the positions of CITs. 
 
Using an alternative measure of speculative activity (Working’s speculative T-
index), Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2010) found the level of speculation not to be 
excessive for agricultural futures markets during the price boom of 2006-08.  This study 
found positions held by index funds to be relatively stable and within the bounds of 15 
 
historical norms.  Similar results were found by Buyuksahin and Harris (2009) for crude 
oil futures and by Till (2009) for crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline futures.  Sanders, 
Irwin and Merrin (2010) suggest that these results imply long-only index funds are 
beneficial, rather than detrimental, to markets dominated by short hedging from 
commercial traders. 
 
A recent report for the OECD by Irwin and Sanders (2010) uses data on positions 
of index traders from the weekly Supplemental Commodity Index Traders reports which 
is more accurate and complete than from the Commitment of Traders reports that has 
been the data source for most previous studies on CITs.  While there is correlation 
between index positions and futures prices through the price spike, there is no apparent 
relationship during 2009.  Irwin and Sanders (2010) use this data to test for causal 
relationships between speculative measures (net long positions and percent of long 
positions by index traders and swap dealers) and futures prices.  As in their previous 
studies, Irwin and Sanders find index funds did not cause a speculative price bubble in 
agricultural futures markets.  While there was no relationship between index trader 
positions and the level of futures prices, Irwin and Sanders (2010) did find evidence that 
increases in index fund positions led to lower market volatility.  The result is consistent 
with the findings of Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2010) and suggests the problem in many 
agricultural futures markets dominated by short hedging is the lack of speculative 
activity rather than an excessive level. 
 
The well publicized OECD report led to a backlash of supporters for the view that 
speculative activity by non-commercial traders is correlated with both the price of 
commodity futures and its volatility.  For example, Frenk (2010) questioned the 
appropriateness of Granger causality tests for variables such as commodity futures 
prices that are so volatile and measured over a short period of time (Irwin and Sanders 
(2010) use a one week lag).  Since the demand fundamentals in the oil market do not 
support the large price changes, Frenk (2010) feels the graphical evidence on non-
commercial participation in commodity futures markets and associated price 
movements is sufficient to support the view that CITs created a speculative price 
bubble. 
 
Although there is mixed evidence whether commodity index traders contributed 
to commodity markets anomalies, there is some consensus on the effects of CITs on 
market volatility.  This contrasts with Hirshleifer (1989, 1990) who argues that 
speculative market activities reduce the hedging premium and price volatility.  However, 
as noted earlier, others claim that the increased volume of trading activity in grain 
futures and the entry of this new group of traders has made the futures market more 
volatile, and difficult to predict.  The empirical evidence tends to support the latter view.  
A positive link between trading volumes and price volatility has been found by Chang et 
al. (1997), Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999), and Irwin and Holt (2004) suggesting an 





5.0  Conclusions and Implications 
  Over the years, critics have argued that futures market prices have been either 
too low or too high.  Speculators have often been the target for the wrath of those 
feeling the futures price does not properly reflect market fundamentals.  Recently, the 
criticism has been vented toward a new type of speculator that has been blamed for the 
dramatic changes in agricultural commodity prices experienced over the last several 
years.  Commodity index traders (CITs) and other large institutional traders are 
commonly accused of exerting a destabilizing influence on commodity prices.  The 
intensity of the debate over the role of CITs appeared to wane with the reduction in 
commodity prices since 2008 but the recent release of a well-publicized OECD report 
on the issue by Irwin and Sanders (2010) along with the doubling of wheat prices and 
the claim by von Braun (2010) and others that the rise was due to speculative activity 
has renewed the debate. 
 
The contrasting opinions still existing highlight the lack of credible consensus that 
has formed on the issue of causation between index fund investments in futures 
markets and commodity prices.  One side fueled by reports from Masters (2008) and 
Soro (2008) note the level of investment by CITs tracks the changes in prices.  The 
virtual hoarding generated by this activity has pushed up prices and that the revolving 
long positions held by these institutional investors puts constant upward pressure on 
prices.  The counter argument is that hoarding cannot occur with futures contracts as 
new supply is automatically created to meet any new demand.  This group including 
Irwin (2008) claim that the passive and transparent investment strategy by CITs, without 
market power, should stabilize prices. It is highly unlikely that CITs would push futures 
prices away from fundamental values for long when their trades are so easily 
anticipated (Irwin 2008).   
 
While both sides agree that there is a correlation between CIT activity and 
commodity futures prices, the direct of causation is the point of contention.  The 
empirical evidence is mixed with very limited support for the view that higher commodity 
prices draws in investment activity by index funds.  However, a recent study by Gilbert 
(2010) appears to partially reconcile the two camps by suggesting commodity index 
funds are a means by which a common, albeit small, demand side shifter across all 
markets (i.e. GDP growth in China and India) can have a large effect across those 
markets.  There is more empirical support for the claim that CITs are associated with 
greater market volatility. 
 
The controversy over the effect of CITs has prompted the regulator of futures 
markets, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), to provide additional 
information on agricultural markets and to consider regulations on position limits, trading 
limits, and margins.  If the CFTC decides to set new position limits for commodities of 
finite supply, this response may weaken the price discovery function of futures markets 
and this would not serve the public interest.  According to FIA (2009), imposing a rigid, 
inflexible position limit solely on U.S. futures trading could cause those traders who 
seek commodity price exposure to shift to OTC or to foreign exchanges.  If price 
discovery shifts to the OTC markets, it is more difficult for the CFTC to oversee. 17 
 
Despite the controversies around the influence of CITs, one can conclude that 
the rise in futures volatility will have implications on the hedging decisions of 
commercials. For example, if hedgers are concerned about mark-to-market risk and 
basis risk, they tend to hold a smaller futures position.  At the same time, higher 
volatility on spot commodity markets calls for a need for price risk management.   
However, during the dramatic commodity futures price rise in the spring of 2009, the 
common price risk tool of forward contracting was not available to producers as some 
grain elevators refused to hedge a position associated with a guaranteed harvest price, 
to the farmer, in order to avoid the financial risks of large margin calls. Thus, an 
increase in commodity market volatility may lead to greater costs for managing risk: 
more costly insurance premiums, higher options premiums, and greater margins for 
hedging.  
 
Commodity price volatility may also have implications for the volume of 
international agricultural commodity trade when individual countries adopt policies that 
restrict imports or exports (e.g., export bans) as a method of coping with price 
variations.  Research on the effects of commodity price volatility on international trade 
(e.g., on volume) is limited.  A few studies suggest an increase in exchange rate 
volatility leads to a reduction in the volume of international trade (Wolf 1996) – as higher 
exchange rate volatility lowers risk-adjusted expected revenue from exports, and 
therefore reduces the incentive to trade (Sercu and Uppal 2003).  In contrast, other 
studies claim exchange rate volatility may not have any effect on the volume of 
international trade if firms can hedge using forward contracts (Baron 1996).  Viaene and 
Vries (1992) show that the net effect of exchange rate volatility on the volume of trade is 
ambiguous depending on whether the country is an importer or exporter.  At an 
institutional level, the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) proposed for developing 
countries in the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization is aimed at 
reducing commodity market volatility, The initiative would allow developing countries to 
protect themselves from world price volatility by levying temporary additional tariffs in 
the face of import quantity surges (quantity trigger) or import price drops (price trigger) 
(Grant and Meilke 2006, 2009). 
 
Commodity index traders are one of the reasons for the significant increase in 
market volatility over the last several years but not the sole cause.  Demand growth 
associated with factors such as rising incomes in developing countries and increases in 
non-food uses like bioproducts, has resulted in edginess within agricultural markets.  
Tight stock to use ratios mean any increase in demand or reduction in supply can send 
prices suddenly higher.  The most recent example is the July 2010 jump in wheat prices 
from the announcement of a decline in Russian supply.  Volatile markets provide 
opportunities for arbitrageurs and speculative money will naturally flow into such a 
market.  Restrictions on the level of such investment will reduce liquidity when markets 
are unstable and liquidity required.  Rather than regulate markets, governments should 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Source: Irwin and Saunders (2010) 
 
Arbitrage: A strategy involving the simultaneous purchase and sale of identical or equivalent 
commodity futures contracts or other instruments across two or more markets in order to 
benefit from a discrepancy in their price relationship. In a theoretical efficient market, 
there is a lack of opportunity for profitable arbitrage.  
 
Back Months: Futures delivery months other than the spot or front month (also called deferred 
months). 
 
Bear: One who expects a decline in prices. The opposite of a bull. A news item is considered 
bearish if it is expected to result in lower prices. 
 
Bear Market: A market in which prices generally are declining over a period of months or years. 
The opposite of a bull market. 
 
Board of Trade:  Any organized exchange or other trading facility for the trading of futures 
and/or option contracts. 
 
Bull:  One who expects a rise in prices; the opposite of bear. A news item is considered bullish 
if it is expected to result in higher prices. 
 
Bull Market:  A market in which prices generally are rising over a period of months or years. 
Opposite of a bear market. 
 
Buyer: A market participant who takes a long futures position or buys an option. An option 
buyer is also called a taker, holder, or owner. 
 
Cash Commodity:  The physical or actually commodity as distinguished from the futures 
contract, sometimes called spot commodity or actuals. 
 
Cash Price:  The price in the marketplace for actual cash or spot commodities to be delivered 
via customary market channels. 
 
CFTC Form 40:  The form used by large traders to report their futures and option positions and 
the purposes of those positions. 
 
Closing Price:  The price recorded during trading that takes place in the final period of a trading 
session’s activity that is officially designated as “the close.” 
 
Commercial: An entity involved in the production, processing, or merchandising of a 
commodity. 
 
Commitments of Traders Report (COT): A weekly report from the CFTC providing a 
breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest for markets in which 20 or more traders hold 
positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC. Open interest 
is broken down by aggregate commercial, non-commercial, and non-reportable holdings. 
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Commodity Futures Trading Commision (CFTC): The Federal regulatory agency established 
by the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974 to administer the Commodity Exchange 
Act. 
 
Commodity Index: An index of a specified set of (physical) commodity prices or commodity 
futures prices. 
 
Commodity Index Fund: An investment fund that enters into futures or commodity swap 
positions for the purpose of replicating the return of an index of commodity prices or 
commodity futures prices. 
 
Commodity Index Swap: A swap whose cash flows are intended to replicate a commodity 
index. 
 
Commodity Index Trader: An entity that conducts futures trades on behalf of a commodity 
index fund or hedge commodity index swap positions. 
 
Commodity-Linked Bond:  A bond in which payment to the investor is dependent to a certain 
extent on the price level of a commodity, such as crude oil, gold, or silver, at maturity. 
 
Commodity Pool: An investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise operated for the 
purpose of trading commodity futures option contracts. Typically thought of as an 
enterprise engaged in the business of investing the collective or “pooled” funds of 
multiple participants in trading commodity futures or options, where participants share in 
profits and losses on a pro rata basis. 
 
Commodity Pool Operator (CPO): A person engaged in a business similar to an investment 
trust or a syndicate and who solicits or accepts funds, securities, or property for the 
purpose of trading commodity futures contracts or commodity options. The commodity 
pool operator either itself makes trading decisions on behalf of the pool or engages a 
commodity trading advisor to do so. 
 
Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA): A person who, for pay, regularly engages in the business 
of advising others as to the value of commodity futures or options or the advisability of 
trading in commodity futures or options, or issues analyses or reports concerning 
commodity futures options. 
 
Commodity Swap: A swap in which the payout to at least one counterparty is based on the 
price of a commodity or the level of a commodity index. 
 
Contango:  Contango is the situation whereby the price of a commodity for future delivery is 
higher than the spot price, or a far future delivery price higher than a nearer future 
delivery. The opposite market condition to contango is known as backwardation. 
 
Corner: (1) Securing such relative control of a commodity that its price can be manipulated, that 
is, can be controlled by the creator of the corner; or (2) in the same extreme situation, 
obtaining contracts requiring the delivery of more commodities than are available for 
delivery. 
 




Delivery: The tender and receipt of the actual commodity, the cash value of the commodity, or 
of a delivery instrument covering the commodity (e.g. warehouse receipts or shipping). 
 
Disaggregated Commitments of Traders Report (DCOT): A weekly report from the CFTC 
providing a breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest for markets in which 20 or more 
traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC. 
Open interest is broken down by managed money, swap dealers, producers and 
merchants, other reporting traders, and non-reporting traders. 
 
Efficient Market: In economic theory, an efficient market is on in which market prices adjust 
rapidly to reflect new information. The degree to which the market is efficient depends on 
the quality of information reflected in market prices. In an efficient market, profitable 
arbitrage opportunities do not exist and traders cannot expect to consistently outperform 
the market unless they have lower-cost access to information that is reflected in market 
prices or unless they have access to information before it is reflected in market prices. 
 
Exchange Traded Fund (ETF): An investment vehicle holding a commodity or other asset that 
issues shares that are traded like a stock on a securities exchange. 
 
Front Month: The spot or nearby delivery month, the nearest traded contract month. 
 
Fund of Funds: A commodity pool that invests in other commodity pools rather than directly in 
futures and option contracts. 
 
Futures Commission Merchant (FCM): Individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, 
and trusts that solicit or accept orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for 
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any exchange and that accept payment from 
or extend credit to those whose orders are accepted. 
 
Futures Contract: An agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for delivery in the future: (1) 
at a price that is determined at initiation of the contract; (2) that obligates each party to 
the contract at the specified price; (3) that is used to assume or shift price risk; (4) that 
may be satisfied by delivery or offset. 
 
Futures-equivalent: A term frequently used with reference to speculative position limits for 
options on futures contracts. The futures-equivalent of an option position is the number 
of options multiplied by the previous day’s risk factor or delta for the option series. For 
example, ten deep out-of-money options with a delta of 0.20 would be considered two 
futures-equivalent contracts. The delta or risk factor used for this purpose is the same as 
that used in delta-based margining and risk analyses. 
 
Futures Option: An option on a futures contract. 
 
Futures Prices: (1) Commonly held to mean the price of a commodity for future delivery that is 
traded on a futures exchange; (2) the price of any futures contract. 
 
Hedge Exemption: An exemption from speculative position limits for bona fide hedgers and 
certain other persons who meet the requirements of exchange and CFTC rules. 
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Hedge Fund: A private investment fund or pool that trades and invests in various assets such 
as securities, commodities, currency, and derivatives on behalf of its clients, typically 
wealthy individuals. Some commodity pool operators operate hedge funds. 
 
Hedger: A trader who enters into positions in a futures market opposite to positions held in the 
cash market to minimize the risk of financial loss from an adverse price change; or who 
purchases or sells futures as a temporary substitute for a cash transaction that will occur 
later. One can hedge either a long cash market position (e.g. one owns the cash 
commodity) or a short cash market position (e.g. one plans on buying the cash 
commodity in the future). 
 
Historical Volatility: A statistical measure (specifically, the annualized standard deviation) of 
the volatility of a futures contract, security, or other instrument over a specified number 
of past trading days. 
 
Implied Volatility: The volatility of a futures contract, security, or other instrument as implied by 
the prices of an option on that instrument, calculated using an option pricing model. 
 
Large Traders: A large trader is one who holds or controls a position in any one future or in any 
one option expiration series of a commodity on any one exchange equaling or exceeding 
the exchange or CFTC-specified reporting level. 
 
Long: (1) One who has bought a futures contract to establish a market position; (2) a market 
position that obligates the holder to take delivery; (3) one who owns an inventory of 
commodities. 
 
Long Hedge: Hedging transaction in which futures contracts are bought to protect against 
possible increases in the cost of commodities. 
 
Managed Money Traders (MMTs): Futures market participants who engage in futures trades 
on behalf of investment funds or clients. While MMTs are commonly equated with hedge 
funds, they may include Commodity Pool Operators and other managed accounts as 
well as hedge funds. While CFTC Form 40 does not provide a place to declare oneself a 
Managed Money Trader, a larger trader can declare itself a “Hedge Fund (H)” or 
“Managed Accounts and Commodity Pools.” 
 
Manipulation: Any planned operation, transaction, or practice that causes or maintains an 
artificial price. Specific types include corners and squeezes as well as unusually large 
purchases or sales of a commodity or security in a short period of time in order to distort 
prices, and putting out false information in order to distort prices. 
 
Nearby Delivery Month: The month of the futures contract closest to maturity; the from month 
or lead month. 
 
Offset: Liquidating a purchase of futures contracts through the sale of an equal number of 
contracts of the same delivery month, or liquidating a short sale of futures through the 
purchase of an equal number of contracts of the same delivery month. 
 
Open Interest: The total number of futures contracts long or short in a delivery month or market 




Option: A contract that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specified 
quantity of a commodity or other instrument at a specific price within a specified period 
of time, regardless of the market price of that instrument. Also see Put and Call. 
 
Over-the-Counter (OTC): The trading of commodities, contracts, or other instruments not listed 
on any exchange. OTC transaction can occur electronically or over the telephone. Also 
referred to as Off-Exchange. 
 
Physical Delivery: A provision in a futures contract or other derivative for delivery of the actual 
commodity to satisfy the contract. 
 
Position: An interest in the market, either long or short, in the form of one or more open 
contracts. 
 
Price Discovery: The process of determining the price level for a commodity based on supply 
and demand conditions. Price discovery may occur in a futures market or cash market. 
 
Reporting Level: Sizes of positions set by the exchanges and/or the CFTC at or above which 
commodity traders or brokers who carry these accounts must make daily reports about 
the size of the position by commodity, by delivery month, and whether the position is 
controlled by a commercial or non-commercial trader. 
 
Rolling Futures Positions: The lifting a near futures position and re-establishing it in a more 
deferred delivery month. 
 
Short: (1) The selling side of an open futures contract; (2) a trader whose net position in the 
futures market shows an excess of open sales over open purchases. See Long. 
 
Short Hedge: Selling futures contracts to protect against possible decreased prices of 
commodities. 
 
Small Traders: Traders who hold or control positions in futures or options that are below the 
reporting level specified by the exchange of the CFTC. 
 
Speculative Bubble: A rapid run-up in prices caused by excessive buying that is unrelated to 
any of the basic, underlying factors affecting the supply or demand for a commodity or 
other asset. Speculative bubbles are usually associated with a “bandwagon” effect in 
which speculators rush to buy the commodity (in the case of futures, “to take positions”) 
before the price trend ends, and an even greater rush to sell the commodity (unwind 
positions) when prices reverse. 
 
Speculative Position Limit: The maximum position, either net long or net short, in one 
commodity future (or option) or in all futures (or options) of one commodity combined 
that may be held or controlled by one person (other than a person eligible for a hedge 
exemption) as prescribed by an exchange and/or by the CFTC. 
 
Speculator: In commodity futures, a trader who does not hedge, but who trades with the 
objective of achieving profits through the successful anticipation or price movements. 
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Spread: The purchase o on futures delivery month against the sale of another futures delivery 
month of the same commodity; the purchase of one delivery month of on commodity 
against the sale of that same delivery month of a different commodity; or the purchase of 
one commodity in one market against the sale of the commodity in another market, to 
take advantage of a profit from a change in price relationships. The term spread is also 
used to refer to the difference between the price of a futures month and the price of 
another month of the same commodity. A spread can also apply to options. 
 
Squeeze: A market situation in which the lack of supplies tends to force shorts to cover their 
positions by offset at higher prices. 
 
Supplemental Commodity Index Traders (CIT): A weekly report from the CFTC providing a 
breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest for markets in which 20 or more traders hold 
positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC. Open interest 
is broken down by commercial, non-commercial, index traders, and non-reportable 
holdings. 
 
Swap: In general, the exchange of one asset or liability for a similar asset or liability for the 
purpose of lengthening or shortening maturities, or otherwise shifting risks. This may 
entail selling one securities issue and buying another in foreign currency; it may entail 
buying a currency on the spot market and simultaneously selling it forward. Swaps also 
may involve exchanging income flows; for example. Exchanging the fixed rate coupon 
stream of a bond for a variable rate payment stream, or vice versa, while not swapping 
the principal component of the bond. Swaps are generally traded over-the-counter. 
 
Swap Dealer (AS): An entity such as a bank or investment bank that markets swaps to end 
users. Swap dealers often hedge their swap positions in futures markets. Alternatively, 
an entity that declares itself a “Swap/Derivatives Dealer” on CFTF Form 40. 
 
Underlying Commodity: The cash commodity underlying a futures contract. Also, the 
commodity or futures contract on which a commodity option is based, and which must be 
accepted or delivered if the option is exercised. 
 
Volatility: A statistical measurement (the annualized standard deviation of returns) of the rate of 
price change of a futures contract, security, or other instrument underlying an option. 
See Historical Volatility, Implied Volatility. 
 
Volume: The number of contracts traded during a specified period of time. It is most commonly 
quoted as the number of contracts traded, but for some physical commodities may be 
quoted as the total of physical units, such as bales, bushel, or barrels. 
 